Bringing Entrepreneurial Ideas to Life by Eesley, Charles E. et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498740
MIT Sloan School of Management
MIT Sloan School Working Paper 4762-09
Bringing Entrepreneurial Ideas to Life
©  Charles E. Eesley, David H. Hsu, and Edward B. Roberts
Charles E. Eesley, David H. Hsu, and Edward B. Roberts
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without
explicit permission, provided that full credit including © notice is given to the source.
This paper also can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498740
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498740
 1 
Bringing Entrepreneurial Ideas to Life* 
 
 
 
by 
Charles E. Eesley, David H. Hsu & Edward B. Roberts 
Draft date: October 2009 
 
Abstract 
Organizational design in the context of new venture development is particularly challenging due to 
initially severe resource constraints. Deepening our understanding of differential productivity in the 
startup resource assembly process is therefore important. We address the twin questions of what assets are 
important to venture performance, and under what conditions are those assets especially important? We 
do so by considering initial venture idea assets and founder contracting experience. The resource-based 
view of the firm stresses developing the right assets, which accords with idea assets. Firm boundary 
theories of the firm emphasize structuring relationships in the right way given a set of organizational 
assets, which accords with founder contracting experience. Using unique survey data, we find that neither 
view by itself is as important as both theories taken together. We therefore advance an integrated 
perspective by showing that new ventures perform better when they both identify valuable resources and 
also assemble human assets with expertise in structuring organizational arrangements to commercialize 
those ideas. An important implication is that organizational resources have a range of potential values, 
and that realizing the upper range of value capture involves the additional ability to structure 
organizational relationships. 
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Introduction 
The literature on firm capabilities and the related resource-based view (RBV) of the firm argues 
that differences between firms in their strategic resources and in their ability to identify and develop rent-
generating resources create differences in firm performance (Penrose 1959, Peteraf 1993, Barney 1991, 
Wernerfelt 1984). Alternatively, the theory of the firm literature stresses the organization of economic 
activity to highlight the importance of structuring and doing the right things with the available resources – 
making the best (efficient) decisions on governance issues (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 
1990, Holmstrom 1999). There is a fundamental difference in the two basic views on how to think about 
the performance of firms. We lack an understanding of when each is most important and how resources 
and capabilities interact with contracting and governance decisions to generate firm performance. The 
former view emphasizes assembling ‘the right assets’ while the other focuses on where and why 
production of economic activity takes place - ‘organizing assets the right way’.   
However, many firms struggle to develop assets and strategic resources precisely because they 
are resource constrained or lack the longstanding reputation needed to convince other parties to provide 
resources. Similarly, many firms are limited in their options to vertically integrate or make other 
contractual arrangements to optimally structure the firm due to a lack of experience, resources, or the 
reputation necessary to implement the desired type of organization. A standard implicit or explicit 
assumption in the prior literature is that the means of achieving ownership of resources or a standard set 
of options for organizational structure is equally important and available to all firms.  
We address the neglected relationship between the ability to secure value-generating resources 
and the governance and contracting experience needed to develop and use those resources most 
efficiently. We do so by examining the conditions under which value is realized in entrepreneurial firms 
when those resources are combined with individuals on the founding team with expertise in structuring 
the appropriate organization to commercialize resources. We show that if we conceptualize resources or 
capabilities as having a range of potential values, then structuring the use of those resources in the right 
way is more likely to result in outcomes in the upper range of the distribution of potential values. As a 
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result, assembling the right assets and organizing them in the right way allows entrepreneurs to most 
effectively bring venture ideas to life. In bringing these two fundamental perspectives together, we 
respond to recent calls for tighter integration of existing theories of the firm and the development of a 
strategic theory of the firm (Mahoney and McGahan 2007). 
The most important decisions shift away from firm boundary choices when resources and 
reputation are severely limited and minimization of transaction costs is obscured by prioritization of 
resource acquisition and firm development. For the entrepreneur, when resource constrained in forming a 
new organization, creating the governance contracts and incentive structures to successfully develop one 
key resource or capability for the market is vital. For example, initially the founders of a new search 
engine such as Google may be too fully occupied in developing their search and advertising algorithms to 
question whether servers to run them should be made or bought. Limited resources and reputation are 
directed towards concerns about hiring and incentivizing top programming or ad sales talent or how 
decision-making across the firm hierarchy will work to develop the basic venture idea. Once the 
organization has developed a threshold level of resources and stability has been achieved, the decisions of 
whether and how to integrate the production of servers or web applications into the firm is of greater 
importance. The purpose of this paper is to show how the value created through resources or capabilities 
is shaped by the firm’s circumstances and the efficiency of the governance and contracting arrangements 
by the firm. A clear understanding of when specific types of assets and capabilities are important in 
driving performance under specific industry conditions is of utmost importance to resource constrained 
firms and entrepreneurs. Clarifying how to extract greater value from idea assets and the relationship 
between assets and contractual and governance issues is of importance to practitioners as well as to the 
strategic theory of the firm. 
Literature and Hypotheses 
Introduction. Early work emphasized the incompatibility and differences in assumptions of 
theories of strategic organizational assets and theories of the firm (Conner and Prahalad 1996), thus 
explaining why these literatures have historically developed their own distinct trajectories. Researchers 
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have recently worked on integrating these perspectives to better explain the locus of production (made 
internally, acquired in the marketplace, or jointly produced in an inter-organizational relationship) and 
differences in firm performance. On the theory of the firm side, much of the integration work has focused 
on transaction cost economics (TCE) to examine organizational boundaries under the thesis that firms will 
act to mitigate the threat of hold-up resulting from specific investments by producing internally rather 
than using the market (Williamson 1975). Indeed, misaligned transactions with respect to TCE-prescribed 
governance structures can be costly (Sampson 2004). Building on TCE theory, scholars integrating the 
RBV perspective have argued that the locus of economic production also depends on firms’ assessment of 
their own capabilities as well as those of their potential partners (e.g., Argyres 1996, Foss 1996, Dyer and 
Singh 1998, Lieblien and Miller 2003, Mayer and Nickerson 2005, Mayer and Salomon 2006). 
Yet, these studies focus on the firm boundary decision. This decision is of most importance to 
managers of more established firms in considering whether to make or buy an input. However, from the 
entrepreneur’s perspective, the choice of firm boundaries, such as the decision to vertically integrate in a 
given upstream or downstream area, may not be of immediate importance. Resource constraints may 
render the choice moot, at least in the short run. Scholars have also noted that economic production need 
not be confined to the choice of internal production or market-based activity. Instead, network structures 
such as inter-organizational alliances can be important (Powell 1990). This channel is likely to be 
particularly important for startups, but the challenge is attracting attention and signaling quality to the 
alliance counterparty. Therefore, instead of examining the determinants of the locus of economic activity, 
we instead evaluate the circumstances under which two classes of startup assets are correlated with new 
venture performance: characteristics of the entrepreneurial idea and contracting experience on the 
founding team.  
Our aim is to contribute to two areas of the literature seeking to integrate the two perspectives. 
First, we examine the role of initial venture idea assets (proxying strategic resources) and contracting 
experience (proxying organization of production issues). Given the special challenges associated with 
new venture development—operating under especially stringent resource constraints (which may 
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foreclose the ability to vertically integrate) and lacking organizational experience and reputation (which 
may raise transaction costs of inter-organizational production), we further examine when initial venture 
assets and contracting experience are especially important. Taken together, this analysis allows us to 
address two related puzzles in the literature: Why do some firms perform better than others even when 
they appear to have developed identical resources? And why do some firms perform better than others 
when they appear to have structured their economic relationships in the same ways?  
A second way in which we aim to contribute to the literature integrating the strategic resource and 
firm boundaries literatures is by examining their joint effect. We develop the argument that the venture 
idea represents not a single determinative value, but actually a distribution of potential values depending 
on its pairing with founder knowledge and expertise in organizing, structuring, and contracting 
arrangements in which to appropriate value from the venture idea. Under this view, value is appropriated 
only when ideas for new resource, activity, or asset combinations are brought into contact and under the 
control of individuals with experience in how to embed them in a web of firm and market contractual 
relationships. The remainder of this section develops these two contributions to the literature.  
Venture ideas as strategic assets. At the very beginning of new firm formation, very few assets 
are likely to be present outside of an idea and the individuals attempting to build a firm to commercialize 
that idea. Following Schumpeter (1942) and others, we refer to a novel combination of existing factors as 
the startup idea. We define venture idea assets as those useful in generating, screening, and developing 
ideas for novel resource combinations. For a new venture, we argue that the unique strategic resource (in 
the sense of being rare, valuable, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable) is the intangible venture idea.1 We 
have in mind a wide-ranging conceptualization of the venture idea, which includes not only the business 
model (why the venture creates value for different stakeholders), but also the revenue model (the way in 
                                                 
1 The capabilities and resource-based approach to the firm is a voluminous literature. Our goal is to apply common 
strands of this literature to our context at hand, while referring the interested reader to literature reviews for more 
detail about the evolution of the theory. 
 6 
which the chosen business model enables revenue generation).2 The venture idea asset is likely to be 
correlated with startup performance to the extent that the idea is novel, proprietary (or more generally has 
barriers to alternative entry), is superior to functional alternatives, and addresses a large and growing 
market segment.  
Initial venture idea resources can have lasting organizational performance effects not only 
because of initial novelty, but also because of the dynamics associated with startup resource assembly 
over time. Firms with stronger venture idea assets are likely to be better able to screen new ideas from 
various communities for more valuable, novel resources. Further, venture idea assets allow the firm to be 
more productive in developing these new ideas and resources to a viable commercial product. A novel 
initial idea can also attract talented employees or managers to join the company in working toward 
commercialization. Similarly, financial resources will more easily flow to firms with more novel ideas 
and those with more capable workers, leading to a virtuous cycle toward organizational performance. 
These ideas are consistent with the literature on resources and capabilities, which has suggested both that 
R&D can result in novelty, which is a strategic resource (e.g., Dierickx and Cool 1989) and that there are 
significant and lasting differences in firms’ abilities to maintain their novelty through their management 
practices (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn 1994).  
We are also interested in the circumstances under which venture idea assets are likely to be 
particularly important in determining startup performance. We believe that industry appropriability 
conditions will be an important moderating variable in the relationship between idea assets and new 
venture performance. Consider an industry environment in which the startup faces a weak appropriability 
regime in which it is not able to capture much of the value that it creates through formal (patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks) or informal (speed in commercialization) means. The market for ideas 
wherein startups ‘sell’ their ideas to industry incumbents for commercialization is dampened by weak 
appropriation conditions due to the absence of alternatives should the incumbent firm try to expropriate 
                                                 
2 A simple example of a business model is the value Google creates for its users by quickly matching internet 
content with users’ queries and searches. While Google’s revenue model is advertising-based, examples of 
alternative revenue models (given the same business model) include transactional or subscription-based revenue. 
 7 
the startup (Gans et al. 2002). As a result, the startup is more likely to pursue self-commercialization 
rather than risk expropriation under weak appropriation conditions. Idea disclosure, which risks 
expropriation, is necessary when negotiating any deal terms, including price, with a counterparty. Since it 
is difficult for startups to compete with industry incumbents on the dimension of assets complementary to 
commercializing the innovation, such as expertise in sales/marketing, manufacturing, or navigating the 
regulatory environment, venture idea assets are likely to be particularly important in weak appropriability 
regimes. In addition, for self-commercialization by resource-constrained startups (which is made more 
likely in weak appropriation environments), investments in elaborating venture ideas may suffer due to 
bearing more of the cost of building downstream commercialization assets such as marketing and 
distribution. A similar logic holds if the startup employs partial or sequential idea disclosure under weak 
appropriability (as in Anton and Yao 2002, 2004) in contracting with counterparties while threatening 
broad idea dissemination (thereby creating competition and driving down rents for the would-be 
expropriating entity in the marketplace). In such a case, access to the venture idea is the critical missing 
ingredient for effective competition, and should be especially important in determining venture 
performance. 
In an industry environment with a strong appropriability regime, however, markets for ideas 
move the basis of competition away from idea novelty and towards operational efficiency and other 
downstream factors for differentiation. Functioning markets for ideas, which are facilitated by strong 
appropriability conditions (Gans et al. 2002), magnify the importance of other factors for firm 
performance and reduce the importance of venture idea assets. The ability to access ideas and technology 
more easily in the market lowers barriers to entry for competing on the basis of technology and increases 
the importance of deal-making and downstream factors. With many potential sellers of ideas, a selling 
firm’s bargaining position is shaped by its potential to develop marketing and operational efficiency if 
allowed to compete in downstream product markets. Firms that are better at forming contractual 
arrangements or that can differentiate themselves as partners with complementary assets are at an 
advantage when markets for ideas function more smoothly. Firms now have the option to license rather 
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than bear the full cost of developing complementary assets. In addition, stronger appropriability 
conditions increase incentives to invest in idea novelty, making innovations more ubiquitous and 
increasing stock on the supply side of the ideas market. A stronger appropriation environment therefore 
dampens properties of idea assets that under weak appropriation made them rent-generating assets – ex 
ante limits to competition, value, immobility, rarity and (with non-exclusive licenses) difficulty to imitate 
(Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993). The above discussion leads to two predictions: 
H1a: Initial venture idea assets will be associated with higher performing firms. 
 
H1b: Initial venture idea assets will be an especially important determinant of new venture 
performance when the firm operates in a weak appropriability environment. 
 
Contracting experience and theories of the firm. The theory of the firm literature actually encompasses 
many different theories. Our goal here is to distill the common phenomenon these theories wish to explain 
as a stepping-stone to discussing why startup contracting experience is likely to relate to new venture 
performance. We also explore the conditions under which contracting experience is likely to be a 
particularly important driver of such performance.  
 Contracting and ownership are at the heart of several theories of the firm. Here, we discuss their 
importance in the TCE, property rights, and network approaches to the theory of the firm. TCE seeks to 
explain how firm boundaries and the locus of economic activity (stylistically firm-organized production 
in contrast to market-oriented exchange) relate to transaction hazards. The main proposition of the theory 
is that when market relationships involve specific investments (those which are worth more inside the 
specific relationship than outside) firms will seek alternatives to such economic organization such as 
through vertical integration (Williamson 1975). The property rights approach to the firm (Grossman and 
Hart 1986) starts from the premise that contracts are fundamentally incomplete in that all states of the 
world cannot be anticipated and contracted upon, and so a crucial benefit to asset ownership is control 
over residual rights (those not explicitly contracted upon). In this approach, firms can incentivize effort 
levels through correct decisions about to whom to allocate residual control rights, with implications for 
the division of rents between firms (Hart 1995). In the network approach to organization and production 
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(e.g., Powell 1990), firms have ownership of different assets, and they are motivated to pursue 
cooperative relationships (such as strategic alliances) to gain access to other resources in the value chain 
or to share risk, but also face challenges such as managing the joint enterprise, guarding against 
expropriation, and enticing the counterparty to participate in the first place. 
 From the standpoint of new ventures, while the TCE and property rights approaches to the theory 
of the firm are helpful in explaining the likely locus of production, they are also limited in that startup 
resource constraints may foreclose backward and/or forward integration options. Network forms of 
organization represent a mode of production intermediate between firm and market modes of organizing 
production, as may be particularly important for startups by achieving some of the benefits of ownership 
while incurring a different set of costs (we will return to a fuller discussion of these challenges below). 
While TCE, property rights, and network theories of the firm stress asset ownership to varying degrees 
(with associated levels of applicability to startup challenges), all three theories share the view that 
contracting is a critical ingredient in determining firm boundaries and performance. In TCE, knowing 
when to contract in the market is emphasized, while in the property rights approach, knowing how to 
contract is paramount. For the network form, with whom to contract, and on what basis is the relationship 
initiated and sustained are central questions. 
 These dimensions of contracting, both internal and external to the firm, are therefore likely to 
shape both firm boundaries and firm performance. Examples of internal contracting include decisions 
concerning the structure of firm decision-making hierarchies, recruiting, incentive and compensation 
systems, and promotion. Examples of contracting with external parties include deals to access external 
resources such as those held by suppliers, customers, manufacturers, innovators, and marketers. Since we 
take the perspective of the new venture, which has at most limited own-experience in contracting, we 
focus on contracting experience by startup founders in their prior career experience. Such experience can 
be helpful in the various dimensions of contracting which are at the heart of the theories of the firm 
discussed above. This is consistent with empirical evidence relating heterogeneity in contract design 
ability to organizational performance (Azoulay and Shane 2001, Shane 2001) whether by means of initial 
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skill in such structuring or by learning over time (Argyres and Mayer 2007, Mayer and Argyres 2004). 
 We are also interested in the conditions under which contracting experience is likely to be 
especially important in determining new venture performance. Our claim is that having venture capital 
(VC) funding is an important moderating variable in the relationship between founder contracting 
experience and venture performance. Consider a startup with VC funding. Such a venture has two assets: 
financial and reputational resources. Financial resources loosen startup resource constraints so that firm 
boundaries are more of a managerial decision variable in that backward or forward vertical integration 
might be feasible. Reputational resources, meanwhile, help make the option of relational contracting3 
feasible for startups. New ventures do not have an established reputation (which is important for relational 
contracting, because it can signal quality and even the likelihood of being in existence over time) so the 
reputation of their affiliates such as VCs, who do have market track records, may serve as a signal of 
venture quality (Stuart et al. 1999, Hsu 2004). Consequently, when a startup is VC funded, the range of 
strategic options regarding firm boundaries is broader (including formal contracting, relational contracting, 
and vertical integration) relative to no VC funding (in which case formal contracting is the only option). 
For this reason, as the startup environment shifts from having VC funding to not having such funding, the 
importance of founder contracting experience increases with respect to venture performance, as formal 
contracting becomes the only avenue to expand organizational boundaries. We therefore predict: 
H2a: Founding team contracting experience will be positively related to new venture 
performance. 
 
H2b: Founding team contracting experience will be an especially important determinant of 
new venture performance when the firm has no venture capital funding. 
 
Complementarity between venture idea assets and contracting experience. For the full value of a venture 
idea to be realized it must become embedded in within- and across-firm relationships, which is consistent 
with the notion that a venture idea is associated with a distribution of potential values, and realizing value 
from the upper part of that distribution depends on pairing the idea with other resources, which is enabled 
                                                 
3 We use the term relational contracting to encompass informal mechanisms (i.e., not based on formal contracts) of 
enforcing discipline in transactions, such as through anticipation of future relationships and/or trust. 
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through founder contracting experience. Consider the example motivating Hellmann and Perotti’s (2009) 
work. To realize the full potential of a venture idea, the idea requires elaboration from experts outside of 
the firm’s boundaries (as Hellmann and Perotti write (p.3): “firms incubate [venture] ideas, markets 
increase their chance of elaboration”). These experts are in a position, however, to expropriate the idea 
originator, who likely has comparatively fewer complementary assets for commercialization relative to 
the outside expert. To illustrate this, consider the case of an incumbent corporate venture capitalist with 
expertise in building-on and elaborating an idea from a new venture, but at the same time possession of 
complementary commercialization assets to quickly take the elaborated idea to market should they gain 
control of the idea. Contracting experience therefore comes into play in this situation, as structuring 
relationships can help enforce discipline so that external parties can help elaborate venture ideas. The 
remainder of this section develops our claim that idea assets when paired with contracting expertise 
bolsters venture performance.4 
Before delving into those arguments, however, it is worth reflecting on the importance of our 
complementarity claim. Whether venture idea assets and contracting experience are complements or 
substitutes shapes our understanding of how theories of firm resources and firm boundaries should be 
integrated. For example, if ideas and contracting experience are substitutes, it might be better to delay 
bringing in contracting experience until a later stage of development or even harmful to bring in excess 
contractual structure too soon (however, simulation methods suggest that early-stage firms should always 
add more structure (Davis et al. 2009)). If they were complementary theories explaining separate aspects 
of organizations then we would not expect to observe an interaction effect. Rather than being conflicting 
theories, the recent literature argues that both organizational resources and theories of the firm shape firm 
boundaries (Madhok 2002, Silverman 1999, Argyres and Zenger 2009). In the arguments that follow, we 
extend this line of research by articulating a rationale for why particular strategic resources in the context 
of new venture development are likely to positively interact with factors shaping firm boundaries.  
                                                 
4 For other examples of firm productivity complementarity, see the empirical studies by Ichniowski, et al. (1997) 
and Bresnahan, et al. (2002). 
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Ventures with strong idea assets are likely to produce more uncertain and novel products, which 
also yields higher variance and a larger range of potential values compared with resources and products 
that are less novel. There is likely greater uncertainty about the firm structures and contracting decisions 
that are well aligned with efficient commercialization in such a novel products organization. A firm 
commercializing less novel resources is more likely to be able to observe similar firms and imitate their 
contractual terms whereas a firm with more unique resources must make these decisions on their own. In 
addition, firms with employees involved in novel tasks may face more potential contractual hazards such 
as unobservable effort levels and the need for workers to make specific investments that are not 
necessarily valued in the external labor market. For example, if optimal contractual arrangements 
incentivize specialized human capital investments or greater effort in developing the firm’s non-human 
assets (Hart and Moore 1990) then they would unlock more of the potential value in novel ideas for 
resource combinations. In such firms, effort may be more unobservable and difficult to contract upon and 
outcomes may be more uncertain. Therefore contracting directly on output can be problematic, as failure 
could result from high- as well as low-effort (the former result through being unlucky, the latter through 
employee shirking).  
In addition, firms with significant venture idea assets also have a greater complementarity with 
contracting experience because they are more likely to need to efficiently transfer (largely tacit) 
information through the organization. For example, if a venture is targeting new markets, sales and 
marketing personnel may have information on latent consumer needs that must be efficiently transferred 
back to the venture. Specialized investments could build greater tacit knowledge among researchers or 
those in sales and marketing. This tacit knowledge can be used to find new uses for the firm’s resources 
(Penrose 1959). Contracting experience can help ensure these specialized investments in the firm are 
made and thus increase the likelihood that venture idea assets result in new uses and markets for the 
firm’s resources. In these ways, venture idea assets would be even more valuable when combined with 
contracting experience for organizational structure, and so we predict: 
H3: Founding team contracting experience complements venture idea assets in generating 
 13 
additional value so that startups with both will be associated with higher performance. 
 
Data and Measures  
 
Empirical Strategy. We seek to understand if more of the variance in firm performance is 
explained when contracting experience is integrated with the organizational capabilities-based view. Two 
main empirical challenges must be overcome – measurement and identification. We will address 
measurement after introducing the empirical context and we delve more deeply into identification after 
building up from simpler models. The specification of the statistical model is as follows: 
E[yi | x] = ! + "’zi +  !’xi + "’zi xi + #’Xi + # + $ + #$ + $i (1) 
In this equation, yi represents our measures of firm performance, xi is a vector of characteristics 
representing founding conditions concerning the venture idea assets. The variable zi is a vector of 
characteristics encompassing the sophistication of the founding team in terms of contracting (governance 
and transactional arrangements). The vector Xi includes our control variables. The variables # and $ 
represent year and industry sector dummies. Equation (1) provides a framework to assess whether idea 
assets or contracting experience are complementary (and "> 0).  
Data. Despite much work on the determinants of performance among large firms (Schmalensee 
1985, McGahan and Porter 1997, Rumelt 1991), and a good deal of literature on when large firms fail 
(Henderson 1993, Tushman and Anderson 1986), very little attention has been paid to testing theories of 
performance among entrepreneurial firms (for exceptions, see Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990, Roberts 
1991). This is an important omission, as formation is when much of the enduring competitive advantages, 
unique assets, or capabilities that form the foundation of many theories of performance and firm strategy 
are put into place (Burton and Beckman 2005). If only existing large firms are included in the sample then 
other firms might have had similar capabilities or similar internal organization but failed, leading to 
questions of survivor bias in empirical work. Thus, young entrepreneurial organizations would seem to be 
the most interesting and valuable place to test theories of the firm because of greater variation.  
We use a dataset initially composed of 43,668 records of MIT alumni who responded to a 2001 
survey of all living alumni (105,928 surveys were sent out for a response rate of 41.2%). These records 
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along with the traditional response bias analyses for characteristics of the individuals have been described 
previously so we refer the interested reader to that discussion (Hsu et al. 2007). Of the respondents to the 
2001 survey, 7,798 individuals (17.9% of the respondents) indicated that they had founded a company. 
These individuals were then mailed a second survey in 2003 that asked detailed questions about the 
formation of their firms. 2,111 founder surveys were completed, representing a response rate of 27.1%. In 
2006 we updated the information on the revenues and employment of the companies. Due to temporal 
right censoring, we drop all firms founded after 1998 in order to have enough time since founding for 
performance measures to have meaning. We also drop architecture and consulting firms to focus on firm 
founding rather than self-employment or partnership based firms. The advantage of our data is the ability 
to know the sources of the start-up idea and also the origins and details of the initial founding team along 
with the multiple performance measures.  
Dependent Variables 
Since our focus is on testing two different theoretical stances on the drivers of firm performance, 
we use two measures of performance as the dependent variables. The variable log employees uses the 
natural log of the employee count for the most recent fiscal year in operation. We also have data on 
acquisitions and initial public offering (IPO) exits that the firms underwent. The variable exited is equal to 
one if the firm experienced an acquisition or IPO and zero if not (as of 2003). The employee count is one 
measure of the firm size and a common goal of many entrepreneurs whereas not all seek acquisition or 
choose to initiate an IPO. However, some firms may have an acquisition or IPO before significant size in 
terms of employees has been achieved. We therefore seek result robustness across the two measures of 
firm size and liquidity event. When log employees is the dependent variable, we use OLS as the 
estimation method, and for analyzing exited as the dependent variable, we use a logit specification. 
Independent Variables 
Venture Idea Assets. Firm capabilities have typically been defined in terms of technological 
capabilities of the firm (i.e., mainframes vs. programming). The prior literature focusing on boundary 
decisions and capabilities has used patent-based measures (Silverman 1999), interviews with industry 
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experts and executives (Mayer and Salomon 2006), or labor productivity (Jacobides and Hitt 2005) as 
capability measures. Since young firms may be expected to lack patents (or still have them in the 
founder’s names rather than the firm name) and a large number of observations precludes interviewing 
experts on each firm, we take a different approach. We measure venture idea assets via a composite index 
of observable characteristics of the founding team as related prior literature has done (Beckman 2006, 
Higgins and Gulati 2006) and also the source of the idea leading to the founding.  
A growing literature examines the impact of scientists and faculty at the firm level in both large 
and entrepreneurial firms (Cockburn and Henderson 1998, Murray 2004). The initial founder 
characteristics should be expected to apply and have a strong imprint lasting later in the life of the firm 
(Burton and Beckman 2008, Stinchcombe 1965). Building on this work, we argue that the presence at 
founding of certain technical individuals more specialized in evaluating and developing ideas for new 
resource combinations represents the venture idea assets. For example, academic faculty members or 
researchers (particularly those in engineering and the sciences) have high levels of human capital but it 
tends to be focused on developing technologies and ideas for new resource combinations, not on 
structuring firms and governance issues. Following the line of previous work on star scientists as a source 
of unique capabilities for firms (Cockburn and Henderson 1998, Murray 2004, Rothaermel and Hess 
2007, Zucker et al. 1998), we examine the impact of faculty involvement in new firm founding. 
Additionally, academic faculty members are busy and have high opportunity costs for their time, so tend 
to become involved in company founding only if the research is especially promising. Individuals better 
able to screen and develop novel ideas have higher opportunity costs to working with ideas with less 
potential. Human assets specialized in idea screening/development in the form of a university faculty 
member is a sign of a higher value idea for a novel bundle of resources/capabilities. Previous work has 
found a positive association between the presence in a young firm of a strong Chief Scientific Officer and 
the number of institutional investors deciding to provide financing (Higgins and Gulati 2006). We include 
a dummy variable for whether the entrepreneur indicated a role of university faculty and use the presence 
of such individuals at founding as an empirical proxy for an R&D capability for identifying and 
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developing non-human organizational assets. We also code idea from research if the founder indicated 
that the idea leading to the start-up product or service came from a research lab. Idea from research 
includes outside funded research while in school, graduate theses, in class, conferences, reading research 
literature, and other research. Our composite measure of venture idea assets is equal to zero if neither of 
these conditions are met, equal to one if only one is met and is equal to two if the firm has both a faculty 
member involved in founding and an idea from research. The results were consistent with using these 
measures independently as well. This is consistent with the findings of others that firms investing in one 
R&D activity also tend to invest heavily in related activities and competencies as well (Henderson and 
Cockburn 1994, Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Thus our measures are probably best interpreted as 
indicators of a stronger set of venture idea assets rather than as causal variables.  
Contracting Experience. Most studies of the role of transaction costs have measured the level of 
contracting hazards in an industry or transaction and associated those with a higher likelihood of 
integration. In this work firm contracting has been defined in terms of hazards of contracting such as asset 
or timing specificity, observability, or risk of expropriation. Some have used different types of mortgage 
contracts to proxy for transaction risks (Jacobides and Hitt 2005); others have measured asset specificity, 
turnover in top management and lines of business (Kaplan et al. 2009). However, measures at the 
transaction or industry level do not shed light on firm-level variance in contracting. The few studies 
examining variation in firm contracting sophistication rather than external contracting hazards have relied 
on indirect measures. Studies have looked at contractual terms as a signal of sophistication such as the use 
of exclusive territories in franchising (Azoulay and Shane 2001) or changes in contract terms over time 
that cannot be attributed to other sources (Mayer and Argyres 2004). Building on prior work (Azoulay 
and Shane 2001, Shane 2001) we expect that the firm founders vary in the extent of their knowledge of 
efficient contracts and we use proxies for the level of contracting expertise present in the founding team. 
Our measures for experience in contracting include a composite index of two proxies for 
contracting experience. Those with prior acquisition experience, and those playing non-technical (sales 
and marketing or finance) roles in the founding team will have more experience in structuring contracts. 
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Acquisition deals have been shown to be quite complex, entailing negotiation on multiple terms and 
contingencies that take up significant managerial time and attention (Hitt et al. 1990, Walsh 1989). Top 
executives often stay with the firm post-acquisition to help handle the complex post-acquisition 
integration and organizational design of the newly integrated firm (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999, Walsh 
1989). We expect that managers who have gone through this complex acquisition and integration process 
would have greater experience in efficient contracting and governance issues. We include prior 
acquisition as a dummy variable proxying contracting experience since these individuals have structured 
new firms and completed complex deals to sell them to other companies. Hsu (2007) found that 
entrepreneurs with prior start-up founding experience had shorter timing to venture capital investment and 
higher valuation, which might also be signals of greater expertise in contracting issues. We include a 
measure of contract founder, which is equal to one if an individual present on the founding team was in a 
non-technical (sales, marketing, or finance cofounder) role. Our contracting experience index is equal to 
zero, 1 or 2 depending on if neither, one or both factors are present. Similar to our R&D capability 
measures, these are best interpreted as indicators or ‘proxies’ of greater expertise in contracting or 
organizational structure issues, rather than as causal variables themselves. 
Moderating and Control Variables. Our predictions involve two moderating variables: VC 
funding and weak appropriability environment. We define a dummy variable, VC, indicating whether the 
venture ever received venture capital funding. We also define weak appropriability as a variable taking 
the value of 1 for the following industries: consumer products, software, electronics, aerospace, energy, 
finance, and machinery industries, and equal to 0 for biomedical and chemical industries. The industries 
in the weak appropriability camp are those in which formal intellectual property protection has been noted 
to be difficult (e.g., Levin et al. 1987). 
A growing consensus from the entrepreneurship literature is that founding teams who had worked 
together previously tend to launch more successful firms (Roure and Maidique 1986, Eisenhardt, 
Schoonhoven 1990, Beckman 2006). A natural tendency towards homophily has been found as teams 
form (Ruef et al. 2003). Faster decision-making, better coordination, higher trust, and mutual 
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understanding all have been found in more homogeneous teams (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990, 
Zenger and Lawrence 1989). A question on the survey asked, “Where did you meet the other founders?” 
We coded the responses for team met via work and team met via family based on survey responses. 
Another survey question asked: “What was the source of the idea for the product or service leading to the 
founding of the company?  Idea from work includes responses of working in industry and also working 
with an outside company while in a university. A set of industry dummies controls for the industry 
segment identified by the entrepreneur (e.g., biomedical, chemicals, electronics). Since we know the 
employee count for a particular year, we include a set of employee year fixed effects. The set of year 
dummies captures temporal changes in the economy. In addition we include a control for the founding 
year and a set of founding year times industry sector fixed effects under the assumption that beyond 
general macroeconomic trends across fields, industry trends over time may affect performance as well. 
We control for the number of cofounders as well as the functional diversity of roles represented on the 
founding team. This control alleviates concerns that the contracting proxy is picking up logistics, finance 
or sales and marketing expertise. Finally to reduce concerns that the contracting proxy is picking up the 
experience level of the founder, we control for the founder’s age as well as educational attainment in the 
form of Master’s or Doctorate degrees. We also include a control for angel, which is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the venture received funding via an angel investor. To control for the fact that older 
firms tend to be larger and at greater propensity for an acquisition or IPO event, we control for log firm 
age as the natural log of the number of years the firm has been alive since the founding year. 
Analysis and Results 
 
Table 1 shows the univariate difference in means tests for log employees and exited conditional 
on low and high levels (0 and 2, respectively) of venture idea assets and contracting experience. 
Significance tests are reported for differences in conditional means from left to right in Panel A, showing 
that higher levels of idea assets, contracting experience and the combination of the two are associated 
with significantly greater firm size and likelihood of an IPO or acquisition. Panel B shows that idea assets 
are significantly more important for performance when firms are in weak appropriation environments. 
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Panel C shows that contracting experience is significantly more important for firm performance when 
firms lack VC funding. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 - 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 presents variable definitions and summary statistics. Table 3 is the pair-wise correlation 
table. While the univariate difference in means tests in Table 1 suggest initial support for our predictions, 
we turn our attention to Table 4 to examine if the results hold after introducing controls. Starting with the 
controls, we find that firms with a larger number of cofounders had significantly higher numbers of 
employees and were more likely to achieve an acquisition or IPO exit. Firms receiving venture capital 
(VC) funding were also significantly higher performers and older firms (log firm age) had significantly 
more employees and a greater likelihood of exit. Firms started by individuals with doctorate degrees were 
significantly lower in likelihood of exit events but not smaller in terms of employees. Turning to the tests 
of hypothesis 1a in model (4-1), the coefficient on idea assets is positive but fails to reach statistical 
significance. In (4-2) we substitute exited for log employees as the dependent variable and again find no 
significant difference in the likelihood of exit for firms with idea assets. Models (4-3) and (4-4) test 
hypothesis 2a that contracting experience is associated with higher performance. Contracting experience 
is associated with greater numbers of employees (p<0.05). While the coefficient in (4-4) is positive, 
indicating a higher likelihood of exit, it does not reach statistical significance. Models (4-5) and (4-6) test 
hypothesis 1b that idea assets are more important in a weak appropriation environment. Supporting the 
hypothesis we find that the interaction term has a positive and significant coefficient indicating that idea 
assets in a weak appropriation setting lead to more employees (p<0.01) and a greater likelihood of exit 
(p<0.05). The coefficient on idea assets is now negative and significant, indicating that in strong 
appropriation environments, idea assets are associated with lower performance on average. Contracting 
experience remains positive but only significant at the 10% level in Model 4-5. Next, (4-7) and (4-8) test 
hypothesis 2b that contracting experience is more important when VC funding is absent. We include an 
interaction term for contracting experience and VC funding and find that its coefficient is negative and 
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significant for both dependent variables. This indicates that the impact of contracting experience is 
significantly greater (less) when VC funding is absent (present) and the firm’s resources and reputation is 
more limited. Finally, (4-9) and (4-10) test the hypothesis of a positive interaction between idea assets and 
contracting experience. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at the 10% level 
for greater numbers of employees. In model (4-10), the coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.01) 
indicating that firms with both idea assets and contracting experience are significantly more likely to have 
an exit. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The real effects implied by this analysis are strong, especially for increasing the likelihood of an 
exit event in the form of acquisition or IPO. In a weak appropriation environment, having idea assets 
provides a 16.6% greater likelihood of an exit and 4.5% more employees for the average firm, holding all 
else equal. Idea assets increase the likelihood of an exit by 6 times in a weak appropriation environment 
compared to their effect in a strong appropriation environment. Without VC funding, contracting 
experience increases the likelihood of exit by 159% and employees by 11.9%. The presence of VC 
funding increases the likelihood of exit by almost 10 times, however, adding additional contracting 
experience when VC is present reduces the likelihood of an exit by 41.4%. When contracting experience 
is present, adding idea assets increases the likelihood of exit by 87.8% and employees by 8.2%. When 
idea assets are present, adding contracting experience on average increases employees by 14.9% and the 
likelihood of exit 20 times over when idea assets exist alone. 
One concern is that unobserved venture idea asset quality might be driving both performance and 
the recruitment of cofounders with contracting experience. If firms with low value venture idea assets 
cannot attract cofounders with contracting experience (or individuals with contracting expertise seek out 
only the best ventures), then this endogenous matching process would cause us to find a spuriously high 
coefficient on the interaction effect between contracting and venture idea assets. This is a difficult 
empirical challenge to entirely overcome since our key independent variables are choices and not 
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randomly assigned to firms, but we offer some analysis and partial reassurance that it is not driving the 
results. First, information and ideas tend to be dispersed in society so ideas may be likely to occur to 
people regardless of their contracting experience. The analysis assumes that “mismatches” occur. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms will be biased upwards unless some firms make mistakes in firm 
formation. If matching is “inefficient” in the sense that the highest quality venture idea assets do not 
typically pair up with cofounders with the most contracting experience, then we can identify accurate 
effects. Results (available from the authors) use a subsample where we are more confident of seeing 
inefficient matching. Removing firms where the team and idea both came from the same source (less 
evidence of search for optimal pairings) gives us greater confidence of accurate results. The coefficients 
remain significant and of similar magnitude reassuring us that endogeneity is not driving the results. 
To further test whether our contracting variables might be serving as a proxy for higher human 
capital founders who would only become involved if there is a chance for a very high outcome we ran 
additional robustness tests. We ran a probit of the likelihood of being in the top 5% of the revenue 
distribution or the valuation at exit distribution (in the case of IPO or acquisition). The results held, and 
the interaction term was positive and significant, alleviating this concern and showing that the likelihood 
of being in the extreme right tails of the distribution increased only when both capabilities and contracting 
expertise were present. Unobservable heterogeneity, mainly in the form of individual ability is a concern, 
but mitigated by the relative homogeneity throughout the sample in terms of educational background and 
high human capital levels of the respondents. 
In interpreting the results from this study, it is useful to keep in mind the three issues of 
representativeness, response rates and self-reporting. It is important to note that the respondents are 
alumni and therefore the sample is not limited to those currently associated with MIT or to technology 
coming from MIT. While these individuals have all passed through MIT, they have had diverse 
experiences before matriculation and since graduation. We do not claim generalizability across the 
spectrum of entrepreneurial activity. A second issue is possible response bias. Graduates who were 
unsuccessful may not have reported failed firms. However, compared to the majority of datasets using 
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public firms for data availability reasons, our data should exhibit less success bias. Next, retrospective 
bias warns that older respondents may display a memory bias particularly when asked to recall details of 
the company formation process. The data also may suffer from self-reporting bias since the entrepreneur 
reported both the dependent and independent variables. As long as these biases are not correlated with 
idea assets or contracting experience then our results should not be affected.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, the results suggest that ownership of venture idea assets and contracting experience are 
both important for firm performance. However, they do not benefit all firms equally. Both exhibit strong 
contingencies with the external environment and further, they exhibit a strong interaction internal to the 
firm. Ownership of venture idea assets appears most important in weak appropriation environments. 
Contracting experience is most important when a firm lacks resources and a reputation. Internal to the 
firm, contracting experience and idea assets exhibit a complementary relationship where contracting 
experience allows the firm to realize greater value from the venture’s idea assets. Firms that lack initial 
idea assets and contracting experience in the founding team are not able to catch up over time.  
This study extends and challenges existing work on the resource-based view. First, we extend the 
theory into a context where resource constraints are binding and the firm does not have an established 
reputation. By examining the context of entrepreneurial firms, we see the origins of firms and new 
resources in a situation of low resources and very little reputation. Many firms face this situation but 
entrepreneurial firms offer an extreme case to better test these ideas. We examine the conditions under 
which certain resources and capabilities are relatively more important for firm performance. Rather than 
asking what general types of resources generate profits, we build on work asking under what 
environmental or internal firm conditions do specific resources matter more (Miller and Shamsie, 2001). 
We provide an alternative to the notion that resources and capabilities must meet general criteria or have 
certain characteristics to create competitive advantage. Resources that meet the criteria for generating 
profits in one context may not in a different environment.  
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Venture idea assets have typically been thought to be a likely candidate for rent-generating 
resources. However, we fail to find support for the first hypothesis (H1a) and the average effect of idea 
assets, as we have measured them, is not significant. Our results suggest that when managers have the 
insight to understand which assets will be relatively more important to have in their industry context, they 
must prioritize developing those assets alongside capabilities and expertise that support the value of those 
assets. We find the counterintuitive result that venture idea assets are relatively more important in weak 
appropriation environments where markets for ideas do not function well. As the prior literature has 
suggested, if inputs cannot be easily bought and sold or the relationship between resources and 
performance is causally ambiguous, this keeps all firms from adopting the resource and eroding the 
advantages (Lippman and Rumelt 2003). Further, our results support the recent line of literature 
emphasizing that the development of resources should not be considered in isolation, but should rather be 
assessed when combined with other capabilities within the firm (Makadok 2001). We find that venture 
idea assets offer a significantly greater performance increase when the firm’s founding team has more 
contracting experience. Taken together, these findings highlight the idea that assets should not be thought 
of has having a single value for a firm. Realization of greater value depends on deploying assets in the 
optimal environment and with the right configuration of organizational assets and experience around them. 
The findings also contribute to the growing line of literature bringing together firm capabilities 
and transaction cost economics. This body of work has generally focused on how both capabilities and 
transaction costs determine firm boundaries, with the implicit assumption that a similar choice set is 
available to all firms. We instead argue that for entrepreneurial firms, vertical integration may not be 
feasible due to resource constraints and relational contracting may be more difficult due to a lack of an 
established reputation. Alternatively, entrepreneurial firms can leverage the resources and reputation of 
venture capital firms. However, for entrepreneurial firms without such partners, formal contractual 
arrangement and thus contracting experience become more important. For instance, we show that when 
venture capital funding (or other partnerships bringing resources and reputation to the firm) is unavailable, 
then having a cofounder with deep experience in contracting is vital. Yet when venture capital is present, 
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bringing in a cofounder largely for contracting experience yields costs but little in the way of 
corresponding benefits not provided by the VC partnership. It is also likely that the VC has experience in 
contracting that may well substitute for lack of such experience within the company. 
Implications for Capabilities. Firm resources and capabilities have both been theorized as driving 
firm performance but the relationship between the two has been unclear. The literature on capabilities has 
focused on performance-enhancing capabilities in established firms and another recent stream has 
examined how capabilities and transaction costs determine boundaries. Yet, it has overlooked how certain 
capabilities, in this case, more efficient contracting structures and systems may unlock greater value in 
certain types of resources. Our results, along with recent work, suggest that a promising direction is the 
integration of resource-based logics with contracting theories focused on internal firm building.  
Besides shaping firm boundaries, we have shown that contracting experience has an interaction 
with venture idea assets. Experience in contracting allows teams to realize greater value from venture idea 
assets. We relax the assumptions in prior work that have emphasized the idea that assets are either generic 
and ubiquitous or specific to a single firm, by showing an intermediate case. Our results show that 
contracting experience may complement certain types of resources, such that when idea assets and 
contracting experience are combined, greater value is created than the sum of each individually. This 
process, by which idea assets and those with contracting expertise combine to generate greater value has 
not previously been theorized. Our results are not meant to suggest that either the resource-based 
literature or the organizational economics-based theory of the firm is wrong. Indeed, we see both effects 
in the data; however, each gives an incomplete view. Instead, each takes on greater importance depending 
on the industry environment. The implication is that we should assess the capacity of various contracting 
structures to raise the value of organizational resources rather than assuming rivalry between the theories. 
Broadly our results could be extended to suggest that the more novel the venture idea assets, the more 
important for successful commercialization is a match with individuals with contracting experience. This 
study provides important advances for the theory of the firm, beyond focusing on firm boundaries but 
rather in studying processes leading to firm performance. 
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Implications for Entrepreneurship. The movement in the RBV literature towards dynamic 
capabilities represents the idea that the beginning stages of new firm or business line formation have been 
under-theorized. Little research considers the origins of resources and capabilities so a major contribution 
of this study is examining initial resources and capabilities before they have become part of a well-
established firm. Another implication of this study is for the formation of entrepreneurial teams. While a 
good deal of work has looked at the composition and experience of top management teams (Hambrick et 
al. 1996, Ruef et al. 2003), less work has looked at how different industry environments might shape the 
optimal founding team. The team can be conceptualized in terms of the venture idea assets and founder 
contracting experience. Neither is universally essential, but when both are present at founding, firms are 
more likely to develop and grow.  
Finally, the focus on the evolution of startup firms over time and subsequent performance is 
related to the work flowing from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (Burton and Beckman 
2005, Burton et al. 2002, Baron et al. 1999, Beckman et al. 2007). The overarching theoretical idea in that 
line of research is that some type of imprinting at the founding of a firm has a lasting effect on the 
organization, its strategic choices, hiring patterns, and performance (Stinchcombe 1965, Burton and 
Beckman 2005). Our results elaborate a mechanism through which entrepreneurs overcome the liability of 
newness that inhibits organizational formation (Stinchcombe 1965). Outside of a lack of legitimacy, 
another source of liability is that new firms often do not know exactly what assets to prioritize developing 
and which firm contractual structures will be best to commercialize a new idea. Our results shed light on 
which teams will be more likely to overcome this liability and realize the value in the ideas they are 
commercializing. Along with Beckman and Burton (2008), our results dispute the notion that firms can 
easily make up for initial inadequacies and weaknesses. 
This study helps address the intersection between resources or capabilities and the theory of the 
firm. Recent work has focused on the choice of governance modes at firm boundaries given a firm’s 
capabilities and hazards to contracting. However, many firms are constrained and the choice to vertically 
integrate may be limited by resources or appropriation environments and the option to contract may be 
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limited by reputational factors and limited resources. Given these constraints, we have sought to answer 
what types of specific resources and capabilities will matter more for the firm’s performance. Specifically, 
in weak appropriation environments and when contracting experience is high, venture idea assets will 
matter more for firm performance. When the firm can leverage the reputation and resources of venture 
capital partners, then contracting experience matters less to the firm. 
Most generally, this paper has proposed to integrate organizational economics theories of the firm, 
particularly its inner workings into strategic theories of capability development. This work may also aid 
existing efforts to better understand the fit between certain types of idea assets and the types of contracts 
or firm structures best suited to commercializing those ideas (Aggarwal and Hsu 2009). In integrating 
these literatures, we have sought to develop a more detailed conceptual model of venture idea assets and 
the process of firm development when choices are constrained. The results hold implications for 
managers and entrepreneurs in how to prioritize development of certain resources and capabilities and in 
founding team composition in different environments. Finally, the paper suggests promising avenues for 
future work integrating capabilities and the theory of the firm, in particular the performance implications 
of team choices in capability development and commercialization processes. 
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Table 1 
Univariate Difference in Means Tests 
 
Panel A Venture idea assets Contracting experience Idea / contracting 
interaction 
 Low High Low High Low High 
Log # 
employees 
2.994 3.552*** 2.836 3.722*** 3.240 4.183*** 
% Exited 
 
0.279 0.500** 0.184 0.346*** 0.344 0.421*** 
 
Panel B 
 
Venture idea assets / appropriation environment interaction 
 Low venture idea assets and strong 
appropriability 
High venture idea assets and strong 
appropriability 
Log # 
employees 
3.473 3.975 
% Exited 0.449 0.400 
 Low venture idea assets and weak 
appropriability 
High venture idea assets and weak 
appropriability 
Log # 
employees 
3.374 4.268*** 
% Exited 0.432 0.800*** 
 
Panel C 
 
Contracting experience / venture capital (VC) funding interaction 
 Low contracting experience and VC 
funding 
High contracting experience and VC 
funding 
Log # 
employees 
4.776 4.788 
% Exited 0.540 0.417 
 Low contracting experience and no VC 
funding 
High contracting experience and no VC 
funding 
Log # 
employees 
2.656 4.203*** 
% Exited 0.209 0.524*** 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Table 2 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN SD 
Dependent variables 
Log employees Natural log of the number of employees 3.40 2.12 
Exited = 1 if venture was acquired or had an initial public offering 0.28 0.45 
Contracting experience variables 
Contracting experience = sum of contract founder + prior acquisition 0.32 0.53 
Contract founder 
 
= 1 if non-technical cofounder present (finance,  
marketing, etc.) 0.20 0.40 
Prior acquisition 
 
= 1 if at least one prior founded firm resulted in an  
acquisition 0.12 0.39 
Startup resource variables 
Idea assets = sum of idea from research + role of univ. faculty 0.24 0.46 
Idea from research = 1 if the venture idea arose through research 0.17 0.38 
Role of univ. Faculty 
 
= 1 if univ. faculty member played a role in venture 
founding 0.05 0.22 
Control variables    
Weak appropriability 
 
= 1 for consumer products, software, electronics, aerospace, 
energy, finance, and machinery industries and 0 for  
biomedical and chemicals industries. 0.86 0.35 
VC = 1 if the firm received venture capital (VC) funding 0.25 0.43 
Angel = 1 if the firm received angel investor funding 0.07 0.26 
Team met via work = 1 if the venture team met through work 0.54 0.50 
Team met via family = 1 if the venture team was related as family 0.09 0.29 
Idea from work = 1 if the venture idea arose through working in industry 0.60 0.49 
Year founded Year in which the venture was founded 1985 10.88 
Number of cofounders Count of the number of cofounders 2.02 1.79 
Functional diversity 
Count of the number of functions (engineering, finance, 
sales and marketing) present on the founding team (max 3) 1.22 0.46 
Master’s degree = 1 if the founder/respondent’s highest degree is a Master’s 0.42 0.49 
Doctorate degree = 1 if the founder/respondent’s highest degree is a Ph.D. 0.17 0.38 
Founder age Age of the founder/respondent 38.70 10.43 
Log firm age Natural log of the number of years in operation 2.73 0.63 
Employee year Most recent fiscal year for employee count 2000 5.70 
Industry sector 
 
 
Dummy variables for industries: aerospace, machinery and other manufacturing, 
biomedical and chemicals, consumer products, electronics and 
telecommunications, energy, finance and consulting, publishing, software, and 
other services 
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Table 3 
Pair-wise correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Log employees 1           
2 Exited 0.38 1          
3 Contracting Experience 0.20 0.20 1         
4 Contract founder 0.15 0.15 0.82 1        
5 Prior acquisition 0.14 0.15 0.60 0.03 1       
6 Idea Assets 0.12 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 1      
7 Idea from research 0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.82 1     
8 Role of univ. faculty 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.58 0.00 1    
9 Weak appropriability -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.13 0.01 1   
10 VC 0.40 0.28 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.05 -0.01 1  
11 Angel 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.12 1 
12 Team met via work 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.11 0.02 -0.17 -0.21 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.05 
13 Team met via family -0.04 -0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 
14 Idea from work 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.36 -0.40 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 -0.09 
15 Number of cofounders 0.26 0.20 0.45 0.50 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.24 0.21 
16 Functional diversity 0.18 0.17 0.68 0.85 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.16 
17 Master’s degree 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
18 Doctorate degree -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 
19 Founder age -0.16 -0.14 0.08 0.00 0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.03 
20 Log firm age 0.24 0.20 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 
21 Employee year -0.03 -0.25 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.03 
22 Year Founded -0.21 -0.18 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 0.07 0.11 0.08 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  
13 Team met via family -0.15 1          
14 Idea from work 0.34 -0.04 1         
15 Number of cofounders 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 1        
16 Functional diversity 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.54 1       
17 Master’s degree -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.01 1      
18 Doctorate degree -0.11 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 1     
19 Founder Age 0.19 0.00 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 1    
20 Firm Age 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 1   
21 Employee year -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.09 0.05 0.01 0.07 -0.03 1  
22 Year Founded -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.15 -0.74 0.31 1 
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Table 4: Startup Size and Liquidation Event Regressions 
Ln(Emp) Pr(Exited) Ln(Emp) Pr(Exited) Ln(Emp) Pr(Exited) Ln(Emp) Pr(Exited) Ln(Emp) Pr(Exited) 
VARIABLES (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) (4-4) (4-5) (4-6) (4-7) (4-8) (4-9) (4-10) 
Idea assets 0.281 -0.120   -1.460** -1.164* 0.324 -0.117 -0.144 -1.153** 
  (0.261)  (0.386)    (0.670) (0.614)  (0.252)  (0.393)  (0.348)  (0.559) 
Contracting experience   0.599** 0.385 0.489* 0.040 0.963*** 0.954** 0.455* 0.041 
    (0.240)  (0.337)  (0.266)  (0.188)  (0.274)  (0.405)  (0.252)  (0.365) 
Idea assets*weak appr.     1.881*** 1.318**     
      (0.715)  (0.639)     
Contracting*VC        -1.017*** -1.489***   
        (0.378)  (0.523)   
Idea assets*contracting         0.737* 1.824*** 
          (0.424)  (0.676) 
Master’s degree 0.226 0.006 0.209 0.013 0.216 0.032 0.148 -0.065 0.183 -0.015 
  (0.217)  (0.301)  (0.211)  (0.300)  (0.244) (0.175)  (0.210)  (0.307)  (0.211)  (0.308) 
Doctorate degree 0.187 -0.914** 0.235 -0.908** -0.240 -0.879*** 0.243 -0.877** 0.202 -0.836** 
  (0.276)  (0.408)  (0.267)  (0.406)  (0.306) (0.239)  (0.267)  (0.409)  (0.269)  (0.418) 
Founder age -0.013 -0.003 -0.018* -0.006 -0.008 0.001 -0.015 -0.002 -0.017* -0.003 
  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.011) (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.015) 
Log firm age 0.969** 0.252 0.140 0.208 0.947 0.046** 0.106 0.345 0.125 0.019 
  (0.448)  (0.480)  (0.153)  (0.481)  (0.588)  (0.023) -0.152  (0.493)  (0.153)  (0.484) 
VC 1.517*** 1.746*** 1.718*** 1.719*** 1.341*** 0.810*** 2.298*** 2.664*** 1.675*** 1.757*** 
  (0.246)  (0.365)  (0.237)  (0.361)  (0.257)  (0.189)  (0.327)  (0.506)  (0.237)  (0.371) 
Angel 0.070 -0.827* 0.089 -0.825* -0.140 -0.316 0.105 -0.878* 0.045 -1.041** 
  (0.339)  (0.502)  (0.326)  (0.500)  (0.391)  (0.279)  (0.322)  (0.509)  (0.325)  (0.523) 
Number of cofounders 0.281** 0.195 0.250** 0.178 0.418*** 0.158* 0.282** 0.227 0.212* 0.166 
  (0.114)  (0.147)  (0.111)  (0.148)  (0.135)  (0.090)  (0.111)  (0.152)  (0.112)  (0.150) 
Functional diversity -0.138 0.126 -0.464* -0.107 -0.300 -0.021 -0.513** -0.132 -0.426* -0.018 
  (0.201)  (0.281)  (0.247)  (0.346)  (0.282)  (0.203)  (0.245)  (0.350)  (0.247)  (0.362) 
Constant 3.292 -1.663 -29.03** 1.256 -4.611 -8.361*** -27.17* -0.591 -29.43** 2.162 
  (7.413)  (2.250)  (14.240)  (4.012)  (3.760)  (1.428)  (14.090)  (3.996)  (14.190)  (4.210) 
Year founded F.E.  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Employee year F.E.  Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Industry F.E.  Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year founded*Industry F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 413 323 400 323 294 311 400 323 400 323 
R-squared 0.527 0.207 0.560 0.210 0.522 0.193 0.573 0.229 0.566 0.228 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Models 4-3 and 4-4 substitute weak appropriability for the industry 
fixed effects. Team met via work, idea from work, and team met via family were included as controls but coefficients are not shown to save space. 
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